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ABSTRACT
The term of social justice is used in social policy as the 
first and main principle without sufficient clarification of the 
term justice. This study brings a view of understanding of the 
term justice in theology, philosophy, law and economy and 
it evaluates them from the perspective of (1) understating of 
justice as an opposite to injustice, i.e. dualistic understanding 
or from the perspective of (2) understanding of justice that is 
defined without such an opposite, i.e. monistic understanding. 
According to this, it recommends applying more precise partial 
principles of merit, solidarity, participation, etc. instead of the 
dualistic and wide understanding of the principle of social jus-
tice in social policy and to apply the principle of justice in the 
monistic approach as a last and ultimate principle in designing 
systems of social policy. 
INTRODUCTION
Although texts concerning social policy usually contain 
the principle of justice in the concept of »social justice«, 
in our opinion the prerequisite of knowledge and under-
standing of justice with any attribute is knowledge and 
understanding of justice without attributes. 
Evolutionary psychology argues that the human sense 
of justice is an outcome of biological adaptation to the 
solving of problems our distant ancestors faced (Walsh, 
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2010). This hypothesis was also confirmed by anthropological studies of indige-
nous peoples (Nader and Sursock, 1986). Even the oldest polytheistic religious 
systems contained gods of justice – the Egyptian goddess Maat, the Indian (Vedic) 
tradition of deity Varuna (and the related Rta principle), the Greek mythology of 
the goddesses Themis and Dike, while for the Romans there was the goddess 
Justitia, etc. Justice was legitimised through its divine origins, later it was the 
metaphysically understood principle of being (dharma in Hinduism, yi in Con-
fucianism, etc.). Even in the European, or more precisely in the Judaeo-Christian 
European tradition, justice was, from the outset, a theme of theology. However, 
this tradition was soon replaced by secular theory, especially philosophy. W. P. 
Pomerleau (2019), in his encyclopaedia entry on Western theories of justice, focuses 
on Ancient Greece (Plato, Aristotle), Medieval Christianity (Augustine, Aquinas), 
Early Modernity (Hobbes, Hume), Recent Modernity (Kant, Mill) and Contemporary 
Philosophers (Rawls and Post-Rawls)1.
With the development of sciences, however, other scientific disciplines also 
joined in taking over this issue, particularly economic and legal sciences of the last 
two centuries. Today, for example, law dichotomically makes a distinction between 
legal and extra-legal justice, general and individual justice, social and political justice, 
formal and material justice, distributive justice and justice in exchange, restitutional 
and retributive justice (Čurila, 2014), in economic sciences there is also global and 
pluralist justice, distributive and procedural justice (Miller, 2003), etc. Nonetheless, 
even distributive justice itself is, for instance, internally structured in relation to 
commutative (correctional) or procedural justice (Günther, 1994) and so on. Thus, 
the process of differentiating views on the issue of justice continues.
The first use of the concept »social justice« is attributed to Thomas Pain at 
the dawn of the 19th century, but we would consider its use in the context of his 
conceptualisation of agrarian justice to be far removed, even when using a con-
temporary economic approach to this issue. The developed industrial revolution 
alone brought about the widespread use of this concept as well as other concepts 
combining justice with other qualifiers. Now, it was not only agrarian justice, but 
also industrial justice (Roosevelt, 1912), later also economic justice, organisational 
justice, environmental justice, spatial justice, etc. through to global justice (Frazer, 
2005; Broszies, 2010). Social justice began to gain ever greater attention particularly 
in the context of the state entering social policy against the background of Bismarck’s 
1 In our attempt to create an overview of the approaches to justice, we have been inspired by this respected choice, 
however, we were forced to reduce it (given its scope and our intention), and yet, on the other hand, to expand 
it: most of the authors included are representatives of philosophy.
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social reforms in the second half of the 19th century, and in particular in connec-
tion with the development of the welfare state in Europe after the Second World 
War. This process also incorporated a further distinction between social justice as 
intergenerational social justice, gender social justice, climate social justice, health 
social justice, non-ageing social justice, intra-cohort social justice, securing social 
justice (e.g. Westwood, 2019), etc. Many open and current topics related to justice 
still remain – for example: what individual justice consists in and how it relates to 
social justice: a topic developed by David Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls and 
others, through to Carol Gilligan or Nel Noddings (Slote, 1998; Katz, 1999).
The concept »justice« can then be considered, quite naturally, to be historically 
older, preceding the formation of the concept »social justice«.
Alongside deepening analytical views on both concepts, the process of the 
relative unbundling of the concepts of justice and social justice was thereby actu-
ally concluded on the one hand, while on the other hand, paradoxically, we keep 
witnessing them considered simplified as mutually identical (Palovičová, 2008).
This problem of the relationship between justice and social justice came to 
the forefront particularly in connection with its use in the context of social policy. 
In her textbooks of various provenances the concept of social justice is increasingly 
frequently featured (but sometimes also the concept of justice without a qualifier), 
although it is interpreted quite differently. Chaïm Perelman (1967) distinguished 
between six forms of »particular« justice: 1. to each according to his works, 2. to 
each according to his needs, 3. to each according to his merits, 4. to each according 
to his rank, 5. to each according to his legal entitlement, 6. to each the same thing. 
It is thus very difficult to objectively form a hierarchy of these »particular« justices. 
Amartya Sen (2009: 12ff) presents the following as the illustration of the complex-
ity of searching for justice, a story of three children – Anne, Bob and Carla – and 
one flute, which rightly belongs to one of them. One of them made the flute, so 
it should belong to him/her, in order to satisfy the principle of merit (to everyone 
according to their work), the second one can play the flute and needs it the most, 
and moreover the flute would bring him/her the most benefit and not only to him/
her (the principle – to everyone according to their needs). And finally, the third child 
is the poorest and therefore the rule that help should be given to those in the most 
adverse conditions (the principle of solidarity) should be respected. Various concepts 
of social policy arrange these views into various hierarchies, giving preference to 
individual »particular«  justices at the expense of others2, whilst these preferences 
2 For example, Bernhard Sutor defines social justice as a firm and unchanging will to give everyone what they 
deserve (Sutor, 1997, p. 65), reducing it simply to merit. There are many other similar examples.
Ljetopis socijalnog rada 2019., 26 (3), 419-445.
422 articles
are decided subjectively or according to political criteria. Regardless of the great 
differences in their content, there is still talk of » justice«, or » social justice« , whilst, 
for example, as Geffert states: »social justice is understood differently, often diametri-
cally so. Its identification is directly related to the form of the state, the type of political 
system, social structure of society, macro- and micro-economic indicators, customs, 
traditions, culture, religion or other form of worldview« (Geffert, 2018: 79).
In our opinion, and as the focal point of this paper, through which we wish 
to contribute to the wealth of literature produced so far on this topic, both the 
problem as well as its solution follow from the fact that between justice and »par-
ticular« justices there exists also an objective, cardinally methodological difference 
that makes it possible to introduce into social policy a criterially clearer approach.
According to our preliminary hypothesis, this difference consists in the fact 
that justice is of a monistic nature, whereas social justice is of a dualistic nature.
By monism here we mean that justice has one fundamental essence, even de-
spite its possible internal subdivision, i.e. accepting justice as a uniform substance, 
existing without needing or being able to confront it with any other substance, 
which could be the opposite (injustice) or, and primarily, any specifying substance. 
Hence, justice is not pluralistic, distinguished by various qualifiers: only one form 
of justice is, in this sense, ontologically fundamental, standing ahead of all its de-
rivatives (applications), featuring various qualifiers.
Dualism always stems from the existence of two basic principles: in our case, 
for example, justice and merit, justice and solidarity, solidarity and subsidiarity, etc. 
In so doing, this may eventuate into various specific forms in which the principle 
of justice is linked with other principles or substances. Dualism generally means 
the relational, double-sided nature of some phenomenon, either the existence 
of an opposite or (primarily) the existence of a modifying characteristic. Dualism 
(or even pluralism) in the understanding of justice leads to an approach in which 
»various justices« , »particular justices« , etc., are possible - including, for instance, 
social justice.
Although the concept »justice« is sometimes used without the qualifier »social«, 
if by its content it is, though, of dualistic nature, this is often merely a terminological 
inconsistency. The mutual relationship of monistically and dualistically understood 
justice may be characterised so that without monistically defined justice no justice 
is possible, and dualistic understandings of justice may exist only as a criterial re-
duction of it.
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APPROACHES TO THE DEFINITION OF JUSTICE
Clearly, the multi-dimensionally sectionalised space of relationships between 
the richly structured concepts of justice and social justice can no longer be addressed 
exhaustively in a single length-limited text. Even today the number of various 
classifications and typologies of the delimitation of justice is almost opaque. Many 
of them (and the one encyclopaedic delimitation we mentioned above) rank ap-
proaches historically; such a diachronic comparison also necessitates interpretation 
in the context of paradigm development according to the period in which they 
were formulated (Kuhn, 1962), without which such comparison would acquire a 
purely formal nature. Generally, it is symptomatic of the various classifications and 
typologies of justice that they do not always differentiate between the approaches, 
working from the methodology of various sciences. Sometimes, approaches to de-
lineate justice are descriptive and normative, with normative being further broken 
down into procedural (which are then subdivided into contractual and judicial) 
and into procedural – and these are subdivided into natural law and positive law 
(Perelman, 1963), where philosophical and legal approaches merge. For example, 
there are defined classical approaches to justice (such as dividing, exchange, and 
remedial, wholly in the Aristotelian spirit) in opposition to legal, social or procedural 
justice (Szutta, 2016). Justice is distinguished in a person’s relationship to their self 
(Nietzsche’s »schlechte Gewissen«), as impartiality in judgement or as unenforced 
goodness in interpersonal relationships (Fischer, 1995), with an overlap of various 
criteria: ethical, psychological, sociological, etc. 
It may even be argued that the stronger the effort of certain authors to com-
prehensively grasp justice, the more the result of their endeavours ends up with 
an overlapping of methodological aspects leading to individual approaches, sub-
sumed into such complexity. All this results in, for example, beautiful and perfect 
encyclopaedic entries, such as the entry for »justice« in the renowned Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Miller, 2017), the main benefit of which is merely (but 
not to omit) their order and clarity.
The term justice undoubtedly belongs to the terms with the widest occurrence 
in the whole diapason of social science: we can find it in the area of interest of the-
ology, philosophical sciences (especially ethics), psychological sciences, sociology, 
law sciences as well as economic sciences. As we will see, there are considerable 
differences in understanding of science in different sciences and scientific disciplines, 
which are subsequently reflected in the definition of the principle of justice, or more 
precisely social justice also in social policy. To explore qualified approaches in the 
whole width of the scientific spectrum would be, however, beyond the ability of an 
individual, therefore we have limited ourselves only to a certain selection.
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In our case, this selection is two-tiered: for the first tier we opted for theological, 
philosophical, legal and economic approaches, and resigned from the sociological, 
psychological, ethical, cultural-anthropological, historical and other approaches. The 
reason for this reduction was both the need for decreasing the number of analysed 
approaches from the aspect of the possibilities of the scope of this study, as well as 
selecting those approaches that have the highest frequency across the range. In the 
second tier, this reduction concerned the selection of authors as representatives 
of individual sciences, focusing on the issue of justice. In the wealth of literature 
there may, of course, arise a polemic over whether the inclusion of one author over 
another and the non-inclusion of another can be objectively justified, for example, 
by the frequency of his/her texts in secondary literature. Nevertheless, we have 
endeavoured in each disciplinary approach selected in the first tier to create, if not 
a representative, so then at least a varied sample of authors focusing also on the 
issues of (social) justice with sufficient intensity in the range of their interests. The 
chosen authors thus need not be representatives of the multiple approaches, but 
rather more loosely perceived examples of such diversity, including a certain (at 
least partial) temporal cross-section of the development of these approaches in 
the methodological frameworks of each science.
There are many approaches and thus also definitions of justice, but also a whole 
range of classifications and typologies which their authors tried to distinguish. In 
the literature we distinguish distributive, procedural, interactive, allocation justice 
and so on. The most common is Aristotelian, the distinguishing of relative and 
absolute justice, which was also the initial premise of our thoughts, however, it did 
not lead to the results that would satisfy us. Apart from that, our approach can only 
be moderately compared with the view of Amartya Sen and his classification of 
approaches of justice as transcendental-institutional and comparative (Sen, 2009). 
Therefore, our primary hypothesis is the formulation that (1) justice can be per-
ceived as the opposite of injustice (and here its definition changes in a wide range 
from symmetry of justice and injustice through various degrees of equivalence to 
no equivalence) – or (2) justice can be perceived as a category itself, which does 
not need this opposite for its definition. We consider this classification as more 
precise than a similar classification of relative and absolute justice – we could talk 
rather about dualistic and monistic understanding. Without the clarification of 
understanding (dualistic or monistic) in searching for possibilities of application 
of the principle of justice in social policy, this application becomes ambiguous or 
even chaotic.
Our ambition – accordingly the possibilities of a scope of our study – will not be 
specifying in detail all previously identified approaches in all sciences: we will limit 
ourselves only on the main features, characterising approaches in these sciences, 
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only through analysis of studies of some selected representatives, although we 
realise that this selection of representatives can be evaluated critically and it does 
not have to be entirely representative from the perspective of a given science or 
discipline. At the same time, it means that we do not have an ambition to complexly 
analyse how various authors perceived or still perceive justice, but we want to focus 
only (or especially) on the fact, which corresponds with our suggested criteria of 
approaches of the given authors. 
JUSTICE IN THEOLOGY
The term justice belongs to the fundamental terms, which occur in a whole 
set of world religions and subsequently in theological systems, which reflect 
them. Because of the scope of this study, which is social policy as in European or 
Euro-American social policy, Christian or more precisely Judeo-Christian theology 
will be sufficient in searching of theological approaches. 
Even the Old Testament, i.e. the initial Jewish biblical texts (Tora, Nebiim, Ke-
tubim), distinguishes two basic forms of justice – God’s justice and human justice. 
Regarding God’s justice perceived as monistic – as an immanent characteristic of 
God: »The Lord is righteous and he loves justice« (Ps 11, 7) or »The Lord is our righteous-
ness« (Jr 23, 6). However, the essential characteristic of God’s justice is that it has 
an absolute character, it does not contain any features of equivalence or relativity. 
Even a punishment for a sin, as a demonstration of potential equivalence is not 
always presented here: God in the Old Testament did not always punish everyone 
who violated his orders.
Regarding human justice in the Old Testament it is considered, as such, a 
characteristic of human behaviour, which meant that this behaviour is in corre-
spondence with God’s commandments (compare for instance Dt 9, 5, Ez 18, 5 and 
following, Ez 33, 13) or justice was directly identified with devotion (Pr 11, 5 and 
following). In this regard, a passage is often cited from the Leviticus book: »I am 
the Lord. Do not defraud or rob your neighbour. Do not hold back the wages of a hired 
worker overnight. Do not curse the deaf or put a stumbling block in front of the blind, but 
fear your God. I am the Lord. Do not pervert justice; do not show partiality to the poor 
or favouritism to the great, but judge your neighbour fairly« (Lv 19, 12 - 15). Due to its 
strong social context, this text is sometimes understood as a biblical expression of 
social justice, but it is only a simplistic »human«  understanding of God’s justice: it is 
not unfair to hold back a salary so that someone has profit from it (which would be 
the opposite of fair behaviour and it would make a relationship between a worker 
and an employer asymmetric, not equivalent – and thus unfair). It is not advisable 
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to curse the deaf or put a stumbling block in front of the blind so that someone 
else would profit from it, etc. The repeated »I am the Lord!«  mainly tells the fact 
that everything that is fair is fair because it is from God and not because it creates 
a relationship of no equivalency, asymmetry between people, etc. Justice in this 
understanding is not an opposite of injustice or its compensation, it is not a result 
of duality of a relationship between a damaged and privileged person, but it is a 
result of the monistic will of God. 
But the Old Testament already perceived the fact that human justice is different 
and contains a pure element of symmetry (an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth), 
which has isolated it more from God’s justice and, exceptionally, only in accordance 
with the latter when it did not contain this element of symmetry or equivalence. It 
is perhaps best captured by the fair and »wise judgement« of King Solomon (1 Reg 
3, 16 and following), which was evaluated this way especially because it overcame 
the parochialism of normal human justice. 
Also the New Testament knows God’s justice, which is sometimes beyond 
normal human understanding. The Evangelist Matthew reminds us that God’s 
justice will be applied at the World’s End in a way that »he will reward each person 
according to what they have done« (Mt 16, 27), but a known parable about workers 
in the vineyards (Mt 20, 1-16) is sometimes interpreted as follows: sins, not only of 
those who live their whole life in accordance with God’s commandments, but also 
of those who sincerely repent their sins at the hour of death will be forgiven. God’s 
justice knows neither symmetry nor equivalence also in the New Testament, as can 
also be seen in the famous »Sermon on the mount« about the blessed (Mt 5). Jus-
tice, there, more strongly resonates as something which is defined in relationships 
between people, but at the same time this is still distinguished from God’s justice, 
which is an essence of human justice, as we can find according to St. Paul (Rm 10, 3). 
Justice in human life is from this perspective imperfect paradoxically by its effort 
to achieve symmetry or at least equivalence. As was written by St. Thomas Aquinas in 
his Theological Summa »justice means to give everyone, what he or she deserves«, justice 
of such behaviour does not lie in its equivalence but in the fact, that in this way it is in 
accordance with God’s justice. Thomas distinguished commutative3 justice - iustitia 
commutativa (involving liabilities of people to each other), distributive justice - iustitia 
distributiva (normatively determining liabilities of a society to its members) and legal 
justice– iustitia legalis (determining liabilities of individuals to a society). Iustitia com-
mutativa hypothetically expresses a symmetric basis of the application of the justice 
principle, iustitia distributiva, on the other hand, is a hypothetic aspect of equivalence 
in the application of this principle. In contrast, iustitia legalis does not explicitly con-
3 Sometimes stated translations such as exchangeable justice or balancing justice are unnecessarily confusing. 
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tain the dual paradigm. Liabilities of people to each other, liabilities of individuals to 
a society as well as liabilities of a society to individuals are fair, however, not because 
they are equivalent (which is not the condition sine qua non), but because they are 
in accordance with the last instance, which is God’s justice (Aquinas, 1947: II - II, 61, 
79). After all, the perspective of Aquinas about justice can be considered as a certain 
combination of a purely theological view with a philosophical view (especially with 
the view of Aristotle, because Aquinas directly built on Aristotle’s classification of 
justice, as we state below). 
The relationship between the monistic Divine and dualistic human justice is 
also addressed by the neotomist Jacques Maritain (1947:120-121, our translation): »The 
goal of a Christian man is not to create of this world the kingdom of God, but to make of 
this world, according to the historical ideal invoked by different ages and various stages 
of its maturing, a place of today’s life in truth and fully human, i.e. full of errors, but also 
full of love, whose social structures would have justice, human dignity, fraternal love«.
In theological approaches, we can assert a relatively clear differentiation 
between the dualistic and monistic approach, with the monistic approach clearly 
dominating the field. This is reflected in social policy, for instance, in Christian social 
doctrine. An example may be the encyclical The Gospel of Life by John Paul II that 
overcomes the dualistic view of justice in such issues as abortion (justice for the 
mother versus justice for the child)4, euthanasia, etc., when it considers the uncon-
ditional respect for the right to life as true justice for every innocent person as one 
of the pillars of any civilised society (Ioannes Paulus II, 1995).
 JUSTICE IN PHILOSOPHY
In Greek mythology, as well as in many other religious systems, justice had a 
Divine origin. Hesiod at the beginning of ancient Greek philosophy understands its 
origin in this way (Hesiod, 1997, fragment 200ff), but already the sophists refused 
application of this principle – and the whole of ancient philosophy continued in 
this perception. Among the ancient philosophers, Socrates already commented 
on the issue of justice. His opinions appeared among several of his students or 
other ancient scholars, especially in Plato’s Republic in the form of famous Socrates 
counter-arguments in the dialogues on justice.
4 An example of a dualistic understanding of justice on this issue may be the US Supreme Court’s decision (1973) 
granting a woman a constitutional liberty to abortion, tying the availability of this right to three trimesters of 
pregnancy: during the first trimester abortion is a woman’s decision because the foetus is as yet incapable of 
independent life, in the last trimester though the foetus becomes viable and a woman can decide here only if 
her life is at risk. In the second trimester, public authority may enter into the woman’s decision-making (Prostak 
2004:40).
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 Plato’s Polyteia (1969) is sometimes translated as the State or Constitution, 
sometimes even with the addendum About justice, especially if fractions (Plato, 
fragment 331 C – 367 D), which are dedicated to this topic are considered as its key 
part. Plato generally continued with secularisation of philosophical thinking and 
he considered justice to be a human virtue. 
Due to limitation of the study, we will observe only the culmination of this 
thinking by Plato’s student Aristotle. The Aristotelian classification of justice, as it is 
contained in the 5th book of his Nicomachean Ethics called Justice and law (Aristotle, 
V), can, after all, be perceived as primarily distinguishing
•	 general justice or legal justice (iustitia legalis – Aristotle, V, 3), which may be 
understood as equality (in preference to the law), thus, not monistic: in the 
perception that law should be the same for everyone (also Rawls perceives 
this justice in this way); here we could also distinguish according to the origin
•	 natural law (iustum naturale, physikon dikaion) and
•	 human law (nomikon dikaion) (Aristotle, V, 10; 1134 b).
•	 partial justice, particular (iustitia particularis – Aristotle, V, 4), which can have 
the form of
•	 distributive justice (iustitia distributiva – Aristotle, V, 6), which deals with 
justice in satisfaction of needs, which has a significantly dualistic nature 
(whether to give more or less to someone, or the same as to someone else)
•	 corrective justice (iustitia correctiva – Aristotle, V, 7), in which there can be 
distinguished
•	 commutative justice (iustitia commutativa), which has a voluntary nature 
and results from a free choice of one party, for example in contractual 
relationships (in purchase, sale, loan, rent, etc.) and it stems from e.g. 
respecting of dignity of the other party; 
•	 remedies justice (iustitia regulativa sive correctiva), which has an involun-
tary nature and results from the need to compensate asymmetry caused 
by theft, fraud, etc.
Despite all the differences in forms of justice, which we determine and com-
prehend thanks to Aristotle, all these forms have (and this also applies to general 
justice) a dualistic foundation, a note about what we find directly in Nicomachean 
Ethics, saying, that justice is always a result of an interaction between people: 
»Justice… is the perfect virtue, but not itself, only in its relationship to a fellow citizen« 
(Aristotle, V, 3, 1129 b). It is then particularly evident in some forms of justice – for 
example in distributive justice the proportionality can be derived from merit, etc. 
Aristotle was for centuries (and indeed to this day) a great inspiration not only 
for the already mentioned St. Thomas Aquinas but also for many other philosophers. 
Among those who addressed the issue of justice, let’s mention, without com-
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pleteness, at least Thomas Hobbes and David Hume. Then Immanuel Kant comes 
on the stage. The term justice does not belong to those frequently mentioned in 
his work: we can find it explicitly used for example in his description of Perpetual 
peace, where he presents justice inside of a state is related to justice between 
states and it is dependent on it. Nevertheless, he influenced numerous important 
authors, not only from the ranks of philosophers, who explicitly discussed the issue 
of justice (inter alia John Rawls (1971) or Gustav Radbruch (1946)), especially by his 
moral philosophy. The basis of justice and the basis of understanding of justice by 
Immanuel Kant is his category of categorical imperative, human behaviour as the 
default presumption. As he presents in the Groundworks of the Metaphysics of 
Morals »act only on maxims that could contribute to a system of universal legislation« 
(Kant, 2002: 18). Kant emerged from the existence of an objectively valid and bind-
ing rule – the categorical imperative is a pure, timeless and abstract obligation to 
which content is given by an individual based on his/her decisions. In our opinion 
understanding of the categorical imperative there is a clearly monistic nature (jus-
tice as the categorical imperative – a pure, timeless, abstract obligation), which is 
even more evident if we consider its difference from the hypothetical imperative, 
assuming behaviour related to a specific purpose, which has, from our perspective, 
features of the dualistic approach (justice as purposeful behaviour). Dualism is re-
flected here in the presence of purpose versus its fulfilment, where we can also see 
symmetry or equivalence or proportionality of fulfilment of this purpose – while in 
the categorical imperative this dimension is missing. 
Also after Immanuel Kant, many philosophers discussed justice (e.g. Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel), but a great interest in this topic was launched out again 
in the 20th century. Among important philosophers of the last century (in addition 
to Ralf Dahrendorf, Jürgen Habermas and later Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick, 
Michael J. Sandel, Alastair MacIntyr, Michal Walzer, Martha Nussbaum and many 
others), the contribution of John Rawls is particularly relevant for our topic – also 
for normativity of his philosophy, but especially for his direct interest in the theory 
of justice. 
As well as Kant (with ideas of whom Rawls operates), who perceived the mean-
ing of purpose for distinction between the categorical and hypothetical imperative, 
Rawls operates with the term utility, but overcoming, for example, Jeremy Bentham’s 
utilitarianism, he prefers justice to decency. Justice continues to be bound to Ben-
tham’s understanding of the presence of equal rights for every individual to freely 
determine content of their own individual good, however, there is the expected 
respecting of their rights by constant declaration of intent of their surroundings 
(compare with Kant’s term »gemeine Menschenverstand« – Kant, 1914:170, § 40), 
agreeing with their potential restriction in order to achieve potential mutual ben-
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efit. Thus, Rawls (1971) follows Kant, but his concept of hypothetical rather than 
Kant’s categorical imperative. Understanding of justice as fairness, which Rawls 
introduces in his Theory of justice (Rawls, 1971:11), is based on the conception of a 
well-organised community, by which it also follows the theory of social contract. 
At the heart of Rawls’ philosophy (from our point of view) is his concept of the 
veil of ignorance, which divides two forms of justice. The first, as hypothetical, he 
characterises as: »The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any 
principles agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as 
a basis of theory. Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which 
put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their 
own advantage. Now, in order to do this, I assume that the parties are situated behind 
a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own 
particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general 
considerations« (Rawls, 1971:137). In the process of consolidating the principles of 
the just distribution of values resulting from collective efforts, complete impartial-
ity should be maintained. At the same time, however, our natural characteristics 
(including gender, race, physical and mental conditions), as well as social status 
(including social origin, culture, upbringing, material situation, contacts, worldview 
and political preferences), make us lose the ability to apply objectively impartial 
rules. Perhaps it is Rawls’ veil of ignorance, preceding the onset of the influence 
of the listed factors on our ability to be fair, that forms the boundary separating 
monistic justice from dualistic. The Rawlsian understanding of the original position 
is rather monistic, but merit as fairness is rather dualistic in nature. This hypothesis 
is also backed up by his thematic proximity to the Old Testament’s union of God’s 
righteousness and humanity’s »uprightness of heart« (De 9:5), or Kant’s distinction 
between a hypothetical and categorical imperative. Ultimately, though, Rawls leans 
towards a dualistic view. Although he did not consider his concept as a general con-
cept of justice, but as a political concept (Rawls, 1971: 221), many of his interpreters 
more or less directly identify it with social justice: »The American philosopher John 
Rawls’ theory of justice has, since its publication in 1971, become a source from which 
all ideas of social justice flow« (Spitz, 2011: 55).
So, in philosophical approaches, we find both dualistic and moralistic approach-
es to justice. As is common for philosophy, we even find both approaches featuring 
under the one and the same author: in the case of Kant, the hypothetical versus 
categorical imperative; in the case of Rawls, the position before and after the veil 
of ignorance, etc. While we can find a continuation of the Aristotelian approach in 
legal approaches, social policy raises reservations against Kant’s approach: when 
an individual gives content to the categorical imperative on the basis of their 
decision, this may be advantageous for the individual client, but need not be ad-
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vantageous for society as a whole (Banks, 1995), bringing justice into conflict with 
social justice, something which highlights for us the risks associated with uniting 
both these concepts. 
Justice in legal sciences
Although Ulpianus, referring to Celsus, derived the origin of law (ius) from jus-
tice (iustitia) (Digesta, 1985:1), it is possible to consider a paradox, that justice is not 
defined by law, but it is considered »only« as its principle. However, the principles 
of law are determined differently and we can find also the principle »suum cuique 
tribuere, suum suique« which means to give everyone what he/she deserves, thus, 
which we find in Plato or Aristotle as the principle of justice of a purely dualistic 
nature. As well, there occurs the principle, according to which, the one who lawlessly 
violated a peaceful state in relation to another should restore it, which corresponds 
with corrective justice as defined by Aristotle, etc. 
Even in the ancient philosophical foundations of legal thought we may encoun-
ter the principle of »epikeia« (έπιείκεια) as a principle of »better justice«, based on 
the presumption that laws are the work of people and, therefore, are imperfect, but 
also that laws are universal in nature, and in specific cases a deviation from the law 
may be just (Aristotle V, 10, 14). While epikeia is not a legal term, it is used as moral 
virtue in favour of bona fide acting just for the application of justice that cannot 
be ensured by law. This line of thought was followed by St Thomas Aquinas, who 
argued that »laws cannot be changed on a case-by-case basis« (Aquinas, 1947: II-II, 
120, 1), linking it to the principle of aequitas (moderation).
Although legal principles are generally not considered as a source of law, in 
the environment of legal theory we can see numerous texts concerning the issue 
of justice. However, it is necessary to remark that law theory in the issue of justice 
very often relies mainly on views (legal) of philosophers and ethicists, economics 
or theoreticians from different scientific disciplines. Major attention to the issue of 
justice in the theory of law began especially in the 20th century. 
Hans Kelsen, a world-renowned Austrian jurist, presented the issue of justice in 
several important studies. A study, which is crucial for our topic, published in 1953 
and called What is justice, ends with a statement that he cannot give an answer 
to this question, but he is fine with the result as well as numerous other scientists, 
who also had not found an answer. He considers absolute justice only as a beautiful 
dream and he is satisfied with relative justice, which indicates his inclination to its 
dualistic understanding. Then he indicates justice of freedom, peace, democracy 
and tolerance as relative (Kelsen, 1975). In his key study, the Pure Theory of Law 
from 1934, he still considered justice even as an irrational ideal, useful for human 
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behaviour, but human perception-proof (Kelsen, 1960). Finally, in his latest study as 
a representative of jurisprudence and of a significant trend in legal positivism, he 
formulated the idea: »Since the basic norm representing the cause of the validity of the 
positive law is not contrary to the divine or to natural law – procedure of justice given 
by the act of will and distinguishable from positive law, the justification of positive law 
by the basic norm can be considered to be a self-justification« (Kelsen, 2010: 1452, our 
translation), by which he clearly separated legal positivism from the theory of justice. 
As it is in the context of perception of the relationship of law, justice and 
morale mentioned by one of the most important theoreticians of law of the 20th 
century Herbert L. A. Hart, approaches of expressing justice and morale in law are 
still not well researched. Laws can only be a legal framework, which is necessary 
to be fulfilled by legal principles and »no positivist can deny the fact that the stability 
of legal systems depends on the relationship with morale« (Hart, 1994: 205) as well as 
on the relationship with justice. 
Incidentally, canon law, which is considered as positive law of the Catholic 
Church, also distinguishes between »canonical justice« (justice moderated by grace) 
and »natural justice« (Codex 1917, Can 192, § 3). 
As is presented by Hans Kelsen cited above, the issue of justice looks different 
in the concept of legal positivism and different in the concept of natural law. It is 
expressed even by basic distinctive principles of both of these concepts. While in 
legal positivism the principle »lex dura sed lex« (hard law but law) is applied, which 
primarily does not solve the issue of justice but rather the issue of legality in natural 
law, the issue of justice is promoted already in the basic principle »lex iniusta non 
sed lex« (unjust law is not law), in which the criterion of justice is even prioritised 
the criterion of legality. 
The most significant input in the context of natural law theories of the last 
century is presented by the contribution of Gustav Radbruch. This German jurist 
is known for the so-called Radbruch’s formula from 1946, in which he reflected 
historical lessons from the blind application of legal positivism in the Third Reich: 
»The conflict between justice and legal certainty may well be resolved in this way: The 
positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even when its content 
is unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless the conflict between statute and justice 
reaches such an intolerable degree that the statute, as ‘flawed law’, must yield to justice« 
(Radbruch, 1946: 105, our translation).
From our perspective, it is not so important if justice takes precedence over 
legality or legality over justice in law – we are interested in the question, what nature 
has justice applied in this way. What is justice, which – if the positive law gets into a 
conflict with it at an unacceptable level - takes precedence over law and acts, like? 
Radbruch does not comment directly on this question, but mainly his term »super 
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legal law« as a certain form of moral imperative, enables expressing the opinion 
that justice in this, Radbruch’s, understanding has a significantly monistic nature. 
Therefore, in the end we can formulate the idea that while the natural legal 
theory is closer to the monistic understanding of justice, in our definition, legal pos-
itivism is closer to the dualistic understanding. Ius naturale is justice par excellence 
and is therefore considered to be the law of the supreme power, which is superior 
to any law authored by man. Natural law theory, therefore, also perceives social 
justice as a common good that arises as the balance of two principles: equality of 
rights and dignity of persons as such (in which it links both to Christian theology 
and Kant) and the social nature of a man who decides freely (Kraynak, 2018).
JUSTICE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCE
In order to achieve completeness, it would be at least appropriate to mention 
that in the conditions of the modern economic theory, Adam Smith was the first one 
who explained the issue of justice. His Theory of Moral Sentiments is the shadow of 
his Wealth of Nations, which is crucial not only in deciding about what is right and 
wrong, but also what is just and unjust. Sense perceptions and common emotions 
are the basis: nature did not allow compliance with regulations on the human mind, 
but anchored it in emotions, which equip every man. In this sense we can see the 
connection (independent from a human will) of Smith’s starting points with Kant’s 
categorical imperative. Smith’s category of an impartial observer is also important: 
it is an ideal balance, which a man acquires during his life based on the interaction 
with other people and he/she cannot acquire it without this interaction. Therefore, 
justice is not a result of a free will, but moreover, it is enforced and its violation is 
sanctioned, thanks to which it becomes a basic pillar of a social life (Smith, 2002). 
From the perspective of our classification we could refer Smith’s concept to the 
monistic rather than dualistic concept of justice, although this assignment is not 
entirely explicit. 
Friedrich August von Hayek significantly – and in our opinion in a form differ-
ent to that of Smith – developed the issue of justice in economic science, when he 
wrote that »a bare fact, or a state of affairs which nobody can change, may be good or 
bad, but not just or unjust. To apply the term ‘just’ to circumstances other than human 
actions or the rules governing them is a categorical mistake« (Hayek, 1998:31). Hayek 
thus refuses to evaluate economic issues by the criterion of justice, which is even 
more significantly found in another text of his work - Law. Legislation and Liberty, 
where he writes: »... effects on the different individuals and groups of the economic 
processes of a free society are not distributed according to some recognisable princi-
ple of justice. We are wrong when we make conclusions that they are unjust and that 
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somebody is responsible for it and he/she should be blamed for it. In a free society in 
which the position of the different individuals and groups is not the result of anybody’s 
design-or could within such a society not be altered in accordance with a principle of 
general applicability-the differences in rewards cannot meaningfully be described as 
just or unjust« (Hayek, 1998: 83).
Hayek is even more critical in the use of the term social justice: »Social justice 
(or sometimes economic justice) came to be regarded as an attribute which the actions 
of society, or the treatment of individuals and groups by society, ought to possess. As 
primitive thinking usually does when first noticing some regular processes, the results 
of the spontaneous ordering of the market were interpreted as if some thinking being 
deliberately directed them, or as if the particular benefits or harm different persons 
derived from them were determined by deliberate acts of will, and could therefore be 
guided by moral rules. This conception of social justice is thus a direct consequence of 
that anthropomorphism or personification by which naive thinking tries to account for 
all self-ordering processes. It is a sign of the immaturity of our minds that we have not 
yet outgrown these primitive concepts and still demand from an impersonal process 
which brings about a greater satisfaction of human desires than any deliberate human 
organization could achieve, that it conform to the moral precepts men have evolved for 
the guidance of their individual actions« (Hayek, 1998: 229).
The term social justice Hayek finally considers as »an abuse of the word« justice 
(Hayek, 1998: 62) but uses the category of distributive justice, which has a purely 
dualistic nature according to our classification.
In the 1960s, in the framework of motivational theories, equity theory began 
to appear in economic sciences, linked to the name of John Stacey Adams. The 
theory works from the fact that the awareness of payment inequity may become a 
motivating force for a worker, which leads to a number of payment equity concepts 
(e.g. the integrating the Porter-Lawler Model of Motivation) with a strongly dualistic 
background (Donnelly, Gibson and Ivancevich, 1989:390). Another stream of eco-
nomic approaches to justice is formed by analytical Marxists. For example, Gerald 
Allan Cohen (2008) also views distributive justice as fairness in the distribution of 
benefits and burdens among individuals, believing that such personal distributive 
justice cannot be attained by structural (e.g. legislative) means, but quite the op-
posite, many distributive injustices can thereby arise.
Nonetheless, neither of the economic approaches to justice needs to be dom-
inated solely by distributive reduction, as might appear from the above. Although, 
Amartya Sen is, in the literature, often considered not only as an economist but also 
as a philosopher or even a jurist (to which undoubtedly contributes the fact that 
among the authors he often cites, but with who he also expertly argues, there are 
all of those who were cited by us in the previous chapters), but he also became the 
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Nobel prize laureate for economy and his understanding of justice (which is decisive 
for us in a great breadth of topics), being based on the framework of distributive 
justice, typical exactly for economic approaches. 
We could finish our part about Sen if his understanding of justice were only 
distributive. Already in the foreword of his Idea of Justice he inspiringly presents 
two concepts from the traditional Indian theory of law: niti and njája. Niti represents 
justice realised through the institutions while Sen describes njája as »a versatile 
idea of realized justice«  (Sen, 2009: xv). Sen agrees with the second concept and 
pragmatically refuses to focus on one institutional side of justice – even though he 
admits that he does not work with the procedural side of justice (Sen, 2010: 299). 
At the same time, he identifies Rawls’ understanding of justice and fairness with 
the concept niti and thus with the institutional aspect of justice (Sen, 2009) and he 
closes the critics of Rawls’ (1971) approach by questioning if institutional justice is 
even possible. After all, he considers Rawls’ concept of »the well-ordered society«, 
which is an essence for functioning justice, as problematic because of the idea that 
in the conditions of the globalising world, the form of a worldwide social contract 
is not real. 
In searching for the basis of fairness as the prerequisite of justice, Sen relies 
on Smith’s idea of an impartial observer rather than on the idea of a social contract 
and institutionalised justice in Rawls’ understanding (Sen, 2009), which he notices 
has affinity with Kant’s categorical imperative (Sen, 2009: 117-118, 124), from which 
we could conclude that in the end, we could assign Sen’s conception of justice to 
the monistic approaches in the definition of justice. 
With a few exceptions, however, a dualistic approach is prevalent in economic 
approaches to justice, or more precisely a distribution concept of justice, or linking 
justice to merit. The liberal-economic understanding of justice is then of a greatly 
reducing nature in general and its dominance in concepts of social justice may 
lead to a deformation of the entire understanding of justice, for example, also in 
the practice of social policy.
Thus, in most approaches our hypotheses regarding monism of justice and 
dualism of social justice in the approaches of individual sciences were confirmed, 
something which can be expressed with a certain degree of simplification as shown 
in Table 1.
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Table 1. Monistic and dualistic approaches to the justice
Monistic approaches Dualistic approaches









Law Natural law Positive law
Economics Smith, sen Hayek
Source: Own elaboration 
The basic simplification of this diagram consists in the fact that there is some-
thing like a smooth transition between both approaches. Neither John Rawls’ (1971) 
veil of ignorance (with all natural characteristics, thanks to which we lose the ability 
to objectively apply impartial criteria in the transition from the original position 
into justice as fairness) is a monolithic iron wall acting as a disjunctive condition. 
Jacques Maritain (1947), too, worked more from a basis of a continuum, from ap-
proximating human justice to God’s righteousness. The greatest risk in applying 
dualistic approaches thus lies in their hypostasis, in a narrowed and at the same time 
absolutised understanding, for example, of distributive justice, etc., in social policy.
SOCIAL JUSTICE AS THE PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL POLICY
In many textbooks (or other monographies in this topic) on social policy, a 
shorter or longer chapter of the principles of social policy is usually presented – 
but, with exceptions, they are formulated as »a required part«, something which a 
student should know as a part of his/her basic knowledge portfolio. The principle 
of social justice is the most often stated as first, basic, most important, etc., and then 
there is the principle of social solidarity, subsidiarity, participation, merit, equality 
of chances, satisfaction of basic (minimal) life needs (to everyone according to 
their needs), meritocratic principle (to everyone according to their abilities) and 
sometimes also other principles and rules. Then, less attention is given to the actual 
application of these principles in drafting of the actual social policy. 
These complexities are manifested also in the application (of principles) of 
justice and social justice in numerous textbooks of social policy, which can be seen 
as representative, expressing certain approaches to social policy in their country of 
origin. As in the previous chapter, in this part of the text we will also try to illustrate, 
rather than complexly analyse, in a certain sample of British and German textbooks, 
but also those from countries of Central and Eastern Europe, how these texts present 
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the concept of justice, or more precisely, social justice. For the sake of comprehen-
siveness, we have also included in this set certain textbooks of Christian (Catholic) 
social doctrine, which is, in particular in continental Europe, considered one of the 
ideological roots of modern social policy (Althammer, 2012: 270)5.
The Oxford textbook on social policy determines justice as »a fair action in 
accordance with the rules. In social policy it means either the allocation of social services 
according to need, or, in the absence of our ability to actually measure all the needs by 
each individual, what is the essence by defining of an egalitarian society in which needs 
are fulfilled most likely equally. In complex societies it may be that an unequal distribu-
tion of services can increase the capacity of the whole system to meet needs and simple 
egalitarian justice is thus difficult to put into practice« (Baldock et al., 1999: 85-86).
Another British textbook presents social justice only within a chapter about a 
neoliberalist aspect of political philosophy and referring to Friedrich Hayek it states: 
»the positive liberty of liberal collectivism demands a rigorous, clearly articulated and 
generally accepted concept of social justice to serve as the basis on which resources can 
be allocated by non-market mechanisms. If market forces are to be modified or dispensed 
with, the least that is needed is a valid basis on which to intervene. ... Social justice as 
a concept lacks a specification. There are many possible criteria of social justice (need, 
merit, desert and so on), but in a free society there can be no general agreement about 
which criterion should be used as the operational foundation of resource allocation« 
(Lavalette and Pratt, 2005: 20).
In a standard German textbook of social policy, social justice is defined as 
follows: »Justice can be pre-scientifically recognized as something which is available for 
others and is not denied to us. In this way we can understand the term equality. From 
the perspective of social state, it is, however, connected with a legal problem: if there is 
no justice, it is necessary to create it. Therefore, a state must take care of justice through 
law in the hope that their interpretation by authorities and courts correspond to this 
intention and conducted according to it« (Frevel and Dietz, 2004: 50, our translation).
Textbooks of Christian social though, convey slightly different accents: »Es-
chatological justice of God ... far beyond human understanding. This has nothing in 
common with ordinary performance justice and justice in exchange, as when a vineyard 
worker worked much less than the others, yet got the same pay. Our »natural« sense 
for values resists this and no one would come up with the idea of transferring this kind 
of wage setting into economic life, because every lazy person would then require full 
wage compensation« (Ockenfels, 1992: 30, our translation).
5 For reasons of space, we will illustrate the approaches of the authors of individual social policy textbooks with 
the aid of only brief quotations from their texts we consider to be the best markers for the given approaches.
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In the environment of Catholic universities, the Compendium of the Church’s 
Social Doctrine, used as the core textbook, approved by the supreme church au-
thorities and citing the Catechism of the Catholic Church, right in the introduction 
states: »when the Church fulfils her mission of proclaiming the Gospel, she bears wit-
ness to man, in the name of Christ, to his dignity and his vocation to the communion of 
persons. She teaches him the demands of justice and peace in conformity with divine 
wisdom. This doctrine has its own profound unity, which flows from Faith in a whole 
and complete salvation, from Hope in a fullness of justice, and from Love which makes 
all mankind truly brothers and sisters in Christ: it is the expression of God’s love for the 
world« (Pontifical, 2004:12). Thus, complete justice exists only as a result of God’s love.
Józef Majka, a professor at the Catholic University of Lublin, wrote in his text-
book on Catholic social teaching, interpreting the famous encyclical Rerum novarum, 
that »it is possible as well as necessary to speak of social justice, the commands of which 
may overcome or even sometimes contradict an existing wrongful social order, when 
such justice rests on natural law and the resultant concept of common well-being and 
natural individual human rights« (Majka, 1987:215, our translation).
Other polish authors present that the idea of social justice is an attempt to 
concretise a broadly understood idea of justice, focused on three questions import-
ant for individuals as well as for social life. They include »a) the equality of chances in 
the economic, social and politic life; b) fair sharing of goods; c) equality before the law« 
Balcerzak-Paradowska and Rączaszek, 2010:67, our translation).
As is stated in a Czech textbook of social policy: »Social justice is the key principle 
of social policy. Under this term we can understand rules, according to which assump-
tions and means of public welfare are redistributed among individual subjects of a 
society« (Kotous et al., 2013:11, our translation). Another Czech author, Igor Tomeš, 
solves the issue of social justice directly linked to solidarity: »In fact, there are two 
completely different entities. Solidarity is manifested by acts, which can but does not 
have to be motivated by social justice. Social justice is an ideological concept« (Tomeš, 
2011:32 – 33, our translation). 
In the Slovak textbook on social policy, it is stated that »the principle of social 
policy belongs to decisive and basic principles. Perception of social justice by different 
authors but also by wide layers of a society is purely subjective and it is subjected to the 
strong pressure of external influences and interests… Justice is usually placed as the 
opposite of injustice« (Stanek et al., 2011:55, our translation).
And finally, at least a sample from a Bulgarian monograph, in which social jus-
tice is defined as »an evaluation term for social phenomena, which expresses a level of 
awareness, requirement and evaluation of mutual relationships« (Dimova et al., 2000: 
53, our translation). Here, we are limited to make a summary, which could be certainly 
even more significantly confirmed by description and analysis of approaches from 
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dozens or perhaps hundreds of textbooks and other monographs on social policy: 
the variety of approaches to understanding and defining of the term (social) justice 
is considerable and we could even critically say, that it is significantly voluntarist.
While social justice is very clearly viewed through dualistic starting points, 
primarily those incorporating economic approaches as a starting point, on the other 
hand, there predominate those based on a distributive understanding of justice 
(Lavalette-Pratt, 2002; Balcerzak-Paradowska and Rączaszek, 2010; Kotous, 2011; 
among others). These are then combined with or linked to those from a spectrum 
of legal approaches, yet again especially those having a positive legal and thus 
dualistic basis of an understanding of justice (Frevel and Dietz, 2004; Tomeš 2011, 
etc.). Even from among philosophical approaches, the sample of textbooks feature 
rather those that lean more toward a dualistic (Rawlsian) basis of understanding 
justice (Baldock et al., 1999, among others). Finally, in social policy textbooks, we 
also encounter dualistic starting points for the understanding of social justice that 
do not have a clear methodological basis, or have this basis embedded in a combi-
nation of several approaches (Dimova, 2000; Stanek, 2011). Most distinctly, a dualistic 
starting point is asserted (quantitatively as well as qualitatively) in approaches that 
have both an economic and legal basis, while approaches that have a philosophical 
or multidisciplinary basis are more open to a monistic starting point. Clearly, or at 
least more clearly, monistic starting points in the understanding of social policy 
are then contained in textbooks of Christian social doctrine, even if the case is that 
here too these starting points are present to a greater (Ockenfels, 1992) or lesser 
degree (Majka, 1987).
Even a small and certainly not representative, albeit sufficiently diverse sample 
of social policy textbooks has confirmed our presumption that in most cases social 
policy relies on a dualistic understanding of social justice and a monistic basis of 
justice falls outside the purview of most of these textbooks. This thereby confirms 
the thesis by Richard Geffert cited in the opening lines (which could find support also 
in other authors’ opinions) that the term »social justice«„ often conceals diametrically 
different content, whilst these differences are conditional upon a number of factors. 
Concurrently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify which factor (form of state, 
social structure of society, economic indicators, etc.) influences decision-making as 
to whether, in a given case, the content of this term is to be fulfilled by these or those 
»ancillary« criteria, so that this decision is often subjectivist, or motivated politically, 
not professionally. The only thing we can draw from this as consequence is the 
statement that between the dually defined »social justices« it is hard to determine 
any mutual hierarchy, as the already cited Amartya Sen (2009) pointed out. On the 
other hand, there is though, an equally clear superiority of monistically understood 
justice that should be the ultima ratio in assessing whether a partial or otherwise 
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defined social justice can also withstand assessment beyond the framework of ap-
plicable legislation, beyond the framework of criteria of age, education, ethnicity, 
etc., beyond the framework of merit, solidarity, etc. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the above, we can consider the following options of the use 
of experience of theology, philosophy, law, economy but also from getting knowl-
edge about the issue of justice from other sciences or science fields (sociology, 
psychology, etc.). 
Principally, it can generally be stated that the theory of social policy, despite 
the above stated diverse range of approaches to the principle of justice, uses just 
a fraction of findings from other sciences and science fields. For example, from the 
whole broad classification framework of Aristotle, only his distributive justice is 
practically reflected in the textbook definitions. 
Distributive justice is on one hand identified with social justice, on the other 
hand we partially experience in the textbooks the fact that it is actually a broad 
principle, which includes justice in assessment of merits, needs, dependence, etc., 
what can be expressed by individual merit and solidarity principles, etc. 
However, it does not mean that the criterion of justice can be divided into 
partial criteria and make it empty internally. Only dualistically understood justice 
can be decomposed through criteria, which we used for the evaluation of the two 
sides. In the case of the dualistic understanding of justice, we can talk about more 
or less just merit, more or less just solidarity, etc. 
Henceforward there still will be a possible and not empty principle of justice, 
which is conceived as monistic. But the principle of justice understood in this way 
is in the list of principles transferred from the first place to the last one – exactly 
according to the principle »last but not least«. After we examined the decision about 
Sen’s flute from the perspective of partial criteria, we, as impartial observers, should 
ask the final question: does our decision respect the principle of merit and solidarity 
according to certain criteria – and moreover is it even just? 
In the same way, as this question was asked by listeners of the parable about 
workers in the vineyard, Immanuel Kant or Gustav Radbruch. And if we accept the 
presumption of a certain degree of subjectivism in the criterial delineation of social 
justice in a dual nature, then the monistic approach also indicates a certain attempt 
at raising the level of its objectivity. 
The analysed issue thus concurrently opens up a discussion regarding the 
question as to how normative and how empirical the nature of social policy theory 
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should be: the question of choice and the characteristics of its principles, is also a 
theoretical question at the utmost. Even if, for example, law is ranked among nor-
mative sciences, this does not mean that defining justice in the paradigms of legal 
positivism places greater normativity into social policy with social justice perceived 
so. Rather, this discourse could be directed toward a proximity of monistic defini-
tion of justice and a normative-prescriptive nature of social policy, while a dualistic 
approach approximates more to an empirical-descriptive nature. The choice of 
definition of justice or of other principles in the chosen social policy model thus 
should not be random, but should correspond to the overall idea of the nature of 
such model.
The analysis of texts of different scientific disciplines indicates plenty of start-
ing points, based on what monistic as well as dualistic principle to justice can be 
applied in social policy. However, it is necessary to be aware of differences, which 
are offered to us by both approaches, or more precisely by their starting points, and 
not to simplify understanding of justice as an internally undifferentiated concept. 
The study submitted, with respect to its scope, only indicated some questions 
or possibilities of extension. Nevertheless, we expect that it may be used as an 
inspiration not only for further research about this issue, but also in the search for 
a better determination of the category of (social) justice and also other principles 
in the theory and practice of social policy. 
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MONIZAM PRAVDE I DUALIZAM SOCIJALNE PRAVDE U SOCIJALNIM 
POLITIKAMA
SAŽETAK
Pojam socijalne pravde koristi se u socijalnim politikama kao primarno i glavno načelo 
bez dostatnog objašnjenja pojma pravde. U ovom radu opisuje se kako se pojam pravde tumači 
u teologiji, filozofiji, pravu i ekonomiji te se ta tumačenja ocjenjuju iz perspektive (1) svođenja 
pravde na opreku nepravdi, odnosno dualističkog tumačenja tog pojma ili iz perspektive (2) 
prema kojoj pravda nema svoju oprečnost, odnosno monističkog tumačenja. S obzirom na to, 
u radu se preporučuje da se u socijalnim politikama koriste preciznija parcijalna načela poput 
zasluga, solidarnosti, participacije i sl. umjesto dualističkog i širokog tumačenja načela socijalne 
pravde. Primjena načela pravde u monističkom smislu preporučuje se tek kao posljednje i krajnje 
načelo u osmišljavanju sustava socijalne politike. 
Ključne riječi: pravda, teologija, filozofija, pravo, ekonomija, socijalna politika.
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